Every person who passes off his goods as those of another commits such act of deceit. Accordingly, in view of Section 22 of Act, continuing action would give rise to a fresh period of limitation. On a reading of plaint it cannot be said that suit is barred by limitation — Threatened invasion of rights of Plaintiff would give rise to a cause of action in favour of Plaintiff.

MIPR 2018 (1) 0363 = MANU/DE/0699/2018

IN THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI

Intel Corporation

V.

Harpreet Singh and Ors.

 

CS (COMM) 223/2018 DECIDED ON: 07.02.2018

Judge

Jayant Nath, J.

Counsel

For Appellant/Petitioner/Plaintiff: Ranjan Narula, Adv.

For Respondents/Defendant: V.N. Koura and Nikhil Mundeja, Advs.

 

Cases referred

Cleveland Opera Co. v. Cleveland Civic Opera Ass’n, 22 Ohio App. 5 Ohio L. Abs. 297

Bloomberg Finance LP v. Prafull Saklecha & Ors. MANU/DE/3673/2013: 207 (2014)
DLT 35: 2013 IXAD (Delhi) 400: 2013 (56) PTC 243 (Del): 2013 IXAD (Delhi)
400

M/s. Bengal Waterproof Limited v. M/s. Bombay Waterproof Manufacturing Company and
Anr. MANU/SC/0327/1997: AIR 1997 SC 1398: 1996 IXAD (SC) 6:1997 (1) AWC
324 (SC): 1997 (2) BLJR 1728: JT 1996 (10) SC 822: 1997-2-LW 636: 1997 (17) PTC
98 (SC): 1996 (8) SCALE 369: (1997) 1 SCC 99: (1996) Supp 8 SCR 695: 1997 (1) UJ
267

Mars Incorporated v. Kumar Krishna MANU/DE/1784/2002: 2003 (26) PTC 60 (Del)

Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. & Ors v. Owners <& Parties, Vessel M.V. Fortune Express & Ors. MANU/ SC/8083/2006: 2006 (2) ALD 36 (SC): 2006 (3) ALT 2 (SC): III (2006) BC 156 (SC): (SC Suppl) 2006 (2) CHN 53: (2006 (2) JCR 344 (SC)): JT 2006 (2) SC 48: 2006 (2) SCALE 30: (2006) 3 SCC 100: (2006) 1 SCR 860

Tilak Raj Bhagat v. Ranjit Kaur MANU/DE/0497/2009: 159 (2009) DLT 470: 2009
(110) DRJ 323

Vigneswara Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. K. Balachandramouli & Ors. (2005) 13 SCC 506

 

Limitation Act, 1963 Section 22

 

Trade Marks Act, 1999

Section 29

Section 29(1)

Section 29(2)

Section 29(3)

Section 29(4)

Section 29(5)

Section 35 Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958

Section 28 Code of Civil Procedure, 1908

Order VII Rule 11

Order 2 Rule 2(3)

HEAD NOTE

Trade mark – Infringement – Limitation – Section 22 of Limitation Act, 1963   The defence of the present suit being barred by limitation is not available even if offending  company i e Defendant No. 3 company was registered in 1987. Therefore  HELD, infringement of a registered Trade mark carried on from time to time would give rise to a recurring cause of action to holder of Trade mark to have a grievance about same. Every person who passes off his goods as those of another commits such act of deceit. Accordingly, in view of Section 22 of Act, continuing action would give rise to a fresh period of limitation. On a reading of plaint it cannot be said that suit is barred by limitation.

Rejection of plaint on the grounds that no cause of action is fallacious on facts of case the plaint should not be rejected Therefore HELD merely because plea raised in plaint is that for present Defendant exists on paper, cannot mean or imply that Plaintiff cannot approach this Court for relief. Plaintiff is not to wait till Defendant activates its operation. Threatened invasion of rights of Plaintiff would give rise to a cause of action in favour of Plaintiff. Hence, there is no merit in plea that plaint does not disclose a cause of action. It is specifically stated in plaint that Trade mark ‘INTEL’ is also registered under class 37 to deal with construction services, i.e. same field is which Defendant is operating. Hence, it cannot be claimed by Defendant that their registered Trade mark is for a different service. Further a person who uses registered Trade mark as its Trade name or part of his business concern dealing in goods and services in respect of which Trade mark is registered is said to infringe Trade mark.  .

JUDGMENT Jayant Nath, J.

IA No. 3293/2015

  1. This application is filed by the Defendants under Order VII Rule 11 Code of Civil Procedure for rejection of the plaint. The Plaintiff has filed the present suit seeking a decree of injunction to restrain the Defendants, their directors etc. from using the name Intel Constructions Private Limited as their Trade name or using the name/mark

 

 

INTEL as their Trade mark, Trade name, email address, website address etc. Other connected reliefs are also sought.

  1. As per the plaint the Plaintiff states that it is the world’s largest semiconductor
    chip maker and the Plaintiff and its subsidiaries are engaged in the business of
    developing advanced integrated digital technology platforms for the computing
    and communication industries. The Plaintiff’s products include microprocessors
    chipsets, motherboards, flash memory, wired and wireless connectivity products
    The details of the Plaintiff’s functioning/operation worldwide have been stated
    in Para 1 of the plaint. It has been further stated that the mark INTEL/formed part of
    the corporate name and a mark for its product since 1968, the year it was incorporated.
    Intel Logo was adopted in 1969. In India the Plaintiff has formally established its
    operation in 1988 with opening of its branch in Bangalore. However, products have
    been exported to India since 1972. It is also pleaded that the Plaintiff uses its INTEL
    mark on products beyond computers also. This brand is being used in many consumer
    electronic products including set-top boxes, media centres, digital audio and video
    devices and household appliances such as microwave ovens. Other items including
    products like T-shirts, polo shirts etc. have also been sold with the said brand.
    Details of the sales, advertisement, promotional expenses etc. have been given in the
    plaint in paragraph 13. In paragraph 16 of the plaint, the details of registration of
    the INTEL word mark in various classes have been stated.
  2. In the plaint it is further pleaded that the Defendants are engaged in the
    construction business and are trading under the name of Intel Constructions Private
    It is stated that around December, 2009 the Plaintiff during the course of
    search into the record of Registrar of Companies (ROC) record came across the
    Defendants Company. It is believed by the Plaintiff that the Defendant Company
    has been incorporated to benefit from the reputation and strength of the INTEL
    mark. It has also been stated that presently the Defendant Company currently exists
    on paper but it can be activated to enlarge their scope of operation, leveraging the
    strength of INTEL mark. It is pleaded that the Plaintiff is aggrieved by such continued
    use of its well known Trade name/Trade mark by the Defendant. It is pleaded that
    the Defendants adoption and use of the INTEL mark as Trade name amounts to
    wilful infringement of the Plaintiff’s registration for the mark INTEL in Particular
    Registration Nos. 678000, 803796, 1240068 within the meaning of Section 29(4) and
    (5) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999. It is further stated that the Defendants have adopted
    the Trade name INTEL to benefit from the Plaintiff’s envious reputation. Hence, it is
    pleaded that the Defendants have been engaged in passing off their business as that
    of the Plaintiff’s business.
  3. The present application filed by the Defendant for rejection of the plaint. It is a
    short application, the relevant part of which reads as follows:-
  4. The Applicant Defendants submit that the Plaint is liable to be rejected for the following amongst other reasons:

(i) The Suit prays for a permanent injunction against the Defendants, for an order for delivery up of all printed matter bearing the names “Intel Constructions Pvt. Ltd.”, and for damages of Rs. 20,00,000 (Rupees Twenty Lacs Only) on account of alleged unlawful use of the Trade name Intel.

(ii) The Suit has been filed under Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 alleging infringement and passing off by the Defendant No. 3 of the Plaintiff’s

 

mark “Intel” without disclosing any incident of infringement or passing off/market deception.

(iii) Para 20 of the Plaint states inter alia as follows:

.. .The Plaintiff submits that Defendant Company currently exists on paper however they can at any time activate and enlarge their scope of operation leveraging the strength of INTEL mark.

(iv) Ex-facie, therefore, the Plaint does not disclose the existence of any cause of action accruing in favour of the Plaintiff and against the Defendant No. 3 (much less against any other Defendant(s) who is/are neither necessary nor proper parties to the suit) for infringement or passing off.

(v) The suit is also hopelessly barred by limitation if the registration of the Defendant No. 3 Company on 6th October, 1987 under the name of “Intel Constructions Pvt. Ltd.” is deemed to constitute the cause of action for the Suit.

  1. Hence, essentially two pleas have been raised. Firstly, that the suit is barred by
    limitation as the Defendant No. 3 Company was registered on 6th October, 1987
    under the name “Intel Construction Private Limited” which was the date when the
    cause of action accrued in favour of the Plaintiff. Secondly, it is pleaded that the
    plaint does not disclose any cause of action accruing in favour of the Plaintiff.
  2. I have heard learned Counsel for the parties. Learned Counsel for the
    Defendant/Applicant has repeated that the suit is barred by limitation. He has
    also relied upon Section 35 of the Trade Marks Act, 1999 to contend that in view
    of the said provisions the user of its name by the Defendant No. 3 Company as its
    own name cannot in any manner give rise to any cause of action in favour of the
    It is further pleaded that under the Companies Act there exists a
    procedure to challenge the name. The Plaintiff should have followed the
    procedure but has wrongly chosen to file the present suit. It has also been pleaded
    that the user of the Trade Mark in the present case is for entirely different service.
    The Plaintiffs admittedly are dealing with computers, computer products,
    computer parts. The Defendant has no presence in the said field and is in the
    field of construction. It is stated that Section 29 of the Trade Marks Act would
    also have no application to the facts of the case and hence the plaint fails to
    disclose any cause of action.
  3. Learned Counsel for the Plaintiff has relied upon the judgment of the Supreme
    Court in M/s. Bengal Waterproof Limited M/s. Bombay Waterproof Manufacturing
    Company and Anr.1 AIR 1997 SC 1398 to contend that in a suit for infringement of
    Trade mark the cause of action is a recurring cause of action and the question of
    limitation would not arise. He has also relied upon the judgments of this Court in
    Mars Incorporated v. Kumar Krishna2 2003 (26) PTC (DeL), Mukerjee and Ors. 2003
    (26) PTC 60 (Del.) and Bloomberg Finance LP v. Prafull Saklecha & Ors.3 207 (2014)
    DLT 35 to contend that in the facts of the present case the plaint discloses a cause
    of action.

 

  1. Relevant part of Order VII Rule 11 Code of Civil Procedure read as follows:-
  2. Rejection of plaint.-The plaint shall be rejected in the following cases:-
  • where it does not disclose a cause of action;
  • where the relief claimed is undervalued, and the Plaintiff, on being
    required by the Court to correct the valuation within a time to be fixed by
    the Court, fails to do so;
  • where the relief claimed is properly valued, but the plaint is written
    upon paper insufficiently stamped, and the Plaintiff, on being required
    by the Court to supply the requisite stamp paper within a time to be fixed
    by the Court, fails to do so;
  • where the suit appears from the statement in the plaint to be barred by
    any law;…
  1. A plaint is liable to be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 Code of Civil Procedure only
    if on a reading of the plaint it fails to disclose a cause of action or it is barred by law.
    In the present case both the above pleas have been raised.
  2. As far as bar of limitation is concerned, it has been pleaded that the plaint is
    barred by limitation as the cause of action arose in 1987 when the Defendant No. 3
    Company was registered.
  3. The Supreme Court in M/s. Bengal Waterproof Limited M/s. Bombay Waterproof
    Manufacturing Company and Anr. (supra) held as follows:-
  4. The aforesaid averments in the plaint clearly show that the present suit
    is not based on the same cause of action on which the earlier suit was
    based. The cause of action for filing this present second suit is the continuous
    and recurring infringement of Plaintiffs Trade mark by the Defendants
    continuously till the filing of the present second suit. We asked the learned
    Counsel for the Defendants as to whether pending the suit and at present
    also the Defendants are trading in the offending goods, namely, bearing the
    mark ‘DACKBACK’ and he informed us that Defendants even at present
    are carrying on this business. Therefore, pending the second suit all
    throughout and during the pendency of these proceedings the Defendants
    have carried on the business of trading in the commodity waterproof
    raincoats ‘DACKBACK’. It is obvious that thus the alleged infringement of
    Plaintiffs Trade mark ‘DUCK BACK’ and the alleged passing off action on
    the part of the Defendants in selling their goods by passing off their goods
    as if they were Plaintiffs goods has continued all throughout uninterrupted
    and in a recurring manner. It is obvious that such infringement of a
    registered Trade mark carried on from time to time would give a recurring
    cause of action to the holder of the Trade mark to make a grievance about the
    same and similarly such impugned off actions also would give a recurring
    cause of action to the Plaintiff to make a grievance about the same and to
    seek appropriate relief from the Court. It is now well settled that an action
    for passing off is a common law remedy being an action in substance of
    deceit under the Law of Torts. Wherever and whenever fresh deceitful act is
    committed the person deceived would naturally have a fresh cause of action
    in his favour. Thus every time when a person passes off his goods as those
    of another he commits the act of such deceit. Similarly whenever and

 

wherever a person commits breach of a registered Trade mark of another he commits a recurring act of breach or infringement of such Trade mark giving a recurring and fresh cause of action at each time of such infringement to the party aggrieved. It is difficult to agree how in such a case when in historical past earlier suit was disposed of as technically not maintainable in absence of proper reliefs, for all times to come in future Defendant of such a suit should be armed with a licence to go on committing fresh acts of infringement and passing off with impunity without being subjected to any legal action against such future acts. We posed a question to the learned Counsel for the Defendants as to whether after the disposal of the earlier suit if the Defendants had suspended their business activities and after a few years had resumed the same and had started selling their goods under the trade mark ‘DACKBACK’ by passing them off, the Plaintiff could have been prohibited and prevented by the bar of Order 2 Rule 2 Sub-rule (3) from filing a fresh suit in future when such future infringement or passing off took place. He rightly and fairly stated that such a suit would not be barred. But his only grievance was that whatever was the infringement or passing off alleged against the Defendants in 1980 had, according to the Plaintiff, continued uninterrupted and, therefore, in substance the cause of action in both the suits was identical. It is difficult to agree. In cases of continuous causes of action or recurring causes of action bar of Order 2 Rule 2 Sub-rule (3) cannot be invoked. In this connection it is profitable to have a look at Section 22 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It lays down that ‘in the case of a continuing breach of contract or in the case of a continuing tort, a fresh period of limitation begins to run at every moment of the time during which the breach or the tort, as the case may be, continues. As act of passing off is an act of deceit and tort every time when such tortious act or deceit is committed by the Defendant the Plaintiff gets a fresh cause of action to come to the Court by appropriate proceedings. Similarly infringement of a registered Trade mark would also be a continuing wrong so long as infringement continues, therefore, whether the earlier infringement has continued or a new infringement has taken place cause of action for filing a fresh suit would obviously arise in favour of the Plaintiff who is aggrieved by such fresh infringements of Trade mark or fresh passing off actions alleged against the Defendant. Consequently, in our view even on merits the learned Trial Judge as well as the learned Single Judge were obviously in error in taking the view that the second suit of the Plaintiff in the present case was barred by Order 2 Rule 2 Sub-rule (3), Code of Civil Procedure.

  1. Hence, infringement of a registered Trade mark carried on from time to time
    would give rise to a recurring cause of action to the holder of the Trade mark to hav;
    a grievance about the same. Every person who passes off his goods as those c
    another commits such act of deceit. Accordingly, in view of Section 22 of the Limitatic:
    Act the continuing action would give rise to a fresh period of limitation. On a readir.;
    of plaint it cannot be said that the suit is barred by limitation.
  2. As far as the contention of the Defendant that no cause of action has arisen i
    favour of the Plaintiff is concerned this Court in Mars Incorporated Kumar Kris/n
    Mukerjee and Ors., (supra) was dealing with a case with somewhat similar facts an
    stated as follows:-

 

  1. The first and foremost requirement of action against the threatened
    infringement of the Trade mark is that the person facing threat must have a
    right which is purported to be infringed. Second, the threat of infringement or
    invasion should be substantial and material in extent. In that eventuality, the
    question will again arise whether a person who has not suffered any damage
    in respect of trade either though competition or through deceptive or confusing
    similarities of the Trade mark adopted by the Defendant either in the same
    trade or goods or in any other manner that may have the consequence of causing
    damage or diluting the Trade mark of the Plaintiff or creating confusion as to
    the source and origin of goods of the Defendants has any right to challenge the
    act of the Defendants.
  2. There is no difficulty in injunction the Defendant from infringing the
    Trade mark of the Plaintiff if the latter is found to have either infringed the
    Trade mark of the Plaintiff directly or by way of passing off. For instance
    Section 28 of the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, protects the
    rights against infringement of a Trade mark of registered proprietor of the
    Trade mark with relation to the goods in respect of which the Trade mark is
    registered and to obtain the relief in respect of infringement of the Trade
    Similarly, Section 29 also protects the right of a person who is even
    not a registered proprietor of the Trade mark or a registered user thereof if
    his Trade mark has been in prior, uninterrupted and long use if the infringing
    Trade mark is identical or deceptively similar in relation to any goods.
    In that case the aggrieved person has to establish the reputation and
    goodwill of the Trade mark. Such a protection is known as an action against
    passing off.
  3. Here we are confronted with a situation where neither the infringer has
    used the infringed Trade mark in relation to any goods in respect of which
    the Plaintiff’s Trade mark is registered nor has the Defendant committed
    offence of passing off. The Defendants have merely adopted the Trade mark
    of the Plaintiff as a part of Corporate name and trading style. Admittedly
    Defendant is a company on paper only. It has neither started nor carried
    out any business nor have they filed annual returns or other mandatory

17.1 am of the view that as in the case of infringement of registered Trade mark or passing off action, the intention and object of infringer is mainly to trade or cash upon widespread and invaluable goodwill and reputation established over the years at huge cost by the Plaintiff and in the process there occurs a dilution of the Trade mark if goods manufactured and sold by infringer happen to be of poor quality, the underline intention of a person who proposes to adopt either same or deceptively or confusingly similar Trade mark or even the Corporate name is to encash and become unjustly rich by trading upon the goodwill and reputation of the Plaintiff.

18…

  1. Be that as it may, a party who is under threat of infringement or passing off of its Trade name cannot be left remediless or in lurch merely for the reasons that the said threat have not materialised causing damage or loss

 

either in trade or reputation or goodwill. Whether a party is entitled to injunction to restrain the threatened infringement upon its Trade name, there have been varying views. One view is that injunctive relief may be obtained even before Defendant actually opens for business, if the threatened act of Defendant is imminent and impending as one does not have to await consummation of the threatened injury to obtain preventive relief (Cleveland Opera Co. v. Cleveland Civic Opera Ass’n, 22 Ohio App. 5 Ohio L. Abs. 297. Other view is that before injunction may properly be issued the complaining party must show infringement of its Trade mark rights as the right of a proprietor of registered Trade mark to protect its mark is confined or limited to the goods specified in registration certificate. According to this view, unless and until the actual damage has been caused or there is likelihood of damage because of confusion or mistake as to the source or origin of the goods on account of deceptively similar mark.

xxx

  1. To expect the aggrieved party to wait and watch for the opening of business or manufacturing or sale or goods under the apprehended infringement of Trade mark is too much. A stitch in time always saves nine and that is what is the essence of Quia Timet Action. With the onset of information technology in modern times, registration of a website which is popularly knows as domain name, a party owning a website has a right to protect the same if any person registers the website with a name which is inherently deceptive. In such cases either party is directed to change the name of the site or handover to its owner. On the same pattern and pedestal is the threatened or apprehended invasion of the Trade mark or Corporate name.
  2. Hence merely because the plea raised in the plaint is that for the present the Defendant exists on paper, cannot mean or imply that the Plaintiff cannot approach this Court for relief. The Plaintiff is not to wait till the Defendant activates its operation. Threatened invasion of the rights of the Plaintiff would give rise to a cause of action in favour of the Plaintiff. Hence, there is no merit in the plea that the plaint does not disclose a cause of action.

15.1 will now deal with the contention of learned Counsel for the Defendant that the present suit does not lie as the Defendant is bona fide using its own name for its business. Reliance is placed on Section 35 of the Trade Mark Act.

  1. Section 35 of the Trade Mark Act reads as follows:-
  2. Saving for use of name, address or description of goods or services.— Nothing in this Act shall entitle the proprietor or a registered user of a registered Trade mark to interfere with any bona fide use by a person of his own name or that of his place of business, or of the name, or of the name of the place of business, of any of his predecessors in business, or the use by any person of any bona fide description of the character or quality of his goods or services.
  3. In Bloomberg Finance LP v. Prafull Saklecha & Ors. (supra) this Court explained
    Section 29 and 29(5) of the Trade Mark Act held as follows:-
  4. Therefore, under Section 29(1), (2) and (3) for infringement to result (i) the impugned mark has to be either similar to or identical with the registered mark

 

and (ii) the goods or services for which the impugned mark is sued has to also either be identical with or similar to the goods or services for which registration has been granted. The scenario is different as regards Section 29(4) of the TM Act, 1999. For infringement to result under Section 29(4), the following conditions are required to be fulfilled:

(i) the person using the impugned mark is neither a registered proprietor in relation to the goods and services for which the mark is registered nor is using it by way of permitted use

(ii) the impugned mark must be used in the course of trade

(ii) the impugned mark has to be either similar to or identical with the registered mark

(iii) the impugned mark is used for goods or services different from those for which registration has been granted;

(iv) the registered Trade mark has a reputation in India;

(v) the use of the impugned mark is without due cause, and takes unfair advantage of or is detrimental to,

  • the distinctive character of the registered Trade mark; or
  • the reputation of the registered Trade mark.
  1. Turning to Section 29(5) of the TM Act, 1999, it is seen that it relates to a situation where (i) the infringer uses the registered Trade mark “as his Trade name or part of his Trade name, or name of his business concern or part of the name, of his business concern” and (ii) the business concern or trade is in the same goods or services in respect of which the Trade mark is registered. If the owner/proprietor of the registered Trade mark is able to show that both the above elements exist then an injunction restraining order the infringer should straightway follow. This is in the nature of a per se or a ‘no-fault’ provision which offers a higher degree of protection where both the above elements are shown to exist. For the purpose of Section 29(5) of the TM Act, 1999, there is no requirement to show that the mark has a distinctive character or that any confusion is likely to result from the use by the infringer of the registered mark as part of its Trade name or name of the business concern.
  2. I may note that Counsel for Plaintiff has drawn my attention to the plaint
    where it is specifically stated that the Trade mark ‘INTEL’ is also registered
    under class 37 to deal with construction services, i.e. the same field is which the
    Defendant is operating. Hence, it cannot be claimed by the Defendant that their
    registered Trade mark is for a different service. The reliance of learned Counsel
    for the Defendant on Section 35 of the Trade Mark Acts is misplaced in view of
    the provisions of Section 29(5) of the Trade Marks Act. A person who uses the
    registered Trade mark as its Trade name or part of his business concern dealing
    in goods and services in respect of which the Trade mark is registered is said to
    infringe the Trade mark.
  3. It is not for this Court to dwell deep into the contention of the Defendant, at this
    At this stage, I am only concerned with as to whether the plaint discloses a

 

cause of action which is to be adjudicated upon by this Court. The defence of the Defendant is not to be taken into account while adjudicating an application under Order 7 Rule 11 Code of Civil Procedure.

  1. Reference may be had to the judgment to the case of Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. & Ors v.
    Owners & Parties, Vessel
    M.V. Fortune Express <& Ors. AIR 2006 SC 1828; wherein the
    Supreme Court held as follows:
  2. It is apparent that the plaint cannot be rejected on the basis of the allegations made by the Defendant in his written statement or in an application for rejection of the plaint. The Court has to read the entire plaint as a whole to find out whether it discloses a cause of action and if it does, then the plaint cannot be rejected by the Court exercising the powers under Order VII, Rule 11 of the Code. Essentially, whether the plaint discloses a cause of action, is a question of fact which has to be gathered on the basis of the averments made in the plaint in its entirety taking those averments to be correct. A cause of action is a bundle of facts which are required to be proved for obtaining relief and for the said purpose, the material facts are required to be stated but not the evidence except in certain cases where the pleadings relied on are in regard to misrepresentation, fraud, wilful default, undue influence or of the same nature. So long as the plaint discloses some cause of action which requires determination by the Court, mere fact that in the opinion of the Judge the Plaintiff may not succeed cannot be a ground for rejection of the plaint.

Similar are the observations of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vigneswara Coop. Housing Society Ltd. v. K. Balachandramouli & Ors. (2005) 13 SCC 506. Reference may also be had to the judgment of this Court in the case of Tilak Raj Bhagat v. Ranjit Kaur  159 (2009) DLT 470 wherein it was held as follows:-

  1. It may be worthwhile to mention here that while considering an application under Order 7 Rule 11 Code of Civil Procedure, the Court has to look at the averments made in the plaint by taking the same as correct on its face value as also the documents filed in support thereof. Neither defence of the Defendant nor averments made in the application have to be given any weightage. Plaint has to be read as a whole together with the documents filed by the Plaintiff.
  2. There is no merit in the present application and the same is dismissed.
    IA No. 12013/2014

Add a Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *